New MACprocessor, latency 1. pipelined every six rows Performance of new circuit: The original circuit has a clock rate of 30MHz and a sampling rate of ISMHz. While the clock rate of the new circuit would be only 20MH2, the sampling rate is now also 20MHz which is 33% faster than the old circuit. Moreover, the power consumption has reduced as the circuit only operates at two-thirds the previous clock rate and has considerably lower number of gates switching every cycle. The reduction in latches also acts to reduce the overall area. Most significantly, the fundamental bottleneck of having to clock the circuit at twice the sampling rate has been removed which will allow filters to be designed with sampling rates up to 100MHz.
References factoring a large composite integer. The blind signature is a regular digital signature; hut it needs to satisfy two additional requirements:
( a ) the content of the message should be blind to the signer ( b ) the signed signature should not be able to be traced by the signer after the signature has been revealed to the public by the owner.
There are cryptographic applications, such as electronic voting and electronic cash systems, developed recently that require the use of blind signatures. Carmenisch er al. proposed the first blind signature scheme [2] based on the discrete logarithm during the rump session of Eurocrypt'94. Later, Horster et al. [3] generalised this approach to design the Meta blind signature schemes. In this Letter we would like to point out that these schemes cannot provide true blind signatures. More specifically, we want to show that the signatures are traceable by the signer. (mod P) The public key y can be computed by at least ? out of n verifiers and the relationship y = g a s (modp) holds, where a is a fixed secret parameter and s is the secret key of the signer. We assume that the signature (z, r, g, p) for the messcge m is known. To obtain a (forged) signature for the message m , the attacker computes U := H(m)-IH(m) (mod w ) and p := p' (modp). Now the signature for the message m is then given by (z, r, g, P), because This attack (and also the attack of [2]) might be noticed by those verifiers who know all previous signatures of the signer. As the parameter r is not modified in the forged signature, the verifierers can reject those signatures where the parameter r was used before. However, this assumption is not realistic and therefore the scheme is insecure. Obviously, the described attack can also be used to forge a signature in the original scheme [l]. The attack does not work in the conventional signature schemes [4, 51 if the (fixed) generator is certified by the trusted authority. Another insider attack on both schemes for an attacker who knows a pair (s, y ) is to choose r and s at random and solve the verification equation for parameter p.
The interesting question arises as to whether the resulting scheme will still be insecure if another variant of the meta-E1Ga-mal signature scheme [6, 71 is used as the underlying signature scheme. The answer is yes, as is shown in the following. The signature for message m is (z, r, g, p) , where r' := pk (mod p). r := d(r', H(m)) using a suitable function d, the congruence A = SE + kC 
Therefore, the digital signature scheme with ( I , n) shared verification is insecure with any other possible signature scheme. The design problem of the scheme is that the parameters g and ! 3 are not authentic and thus could be chosen arbitrarily by an attacker.
This can he prevented if the value H(p, y ) is additionally signed by the signer using any conventional signature scheme. Thus y (and therefore g) and p are authentic. This signature can only be verified after the f verifiers have computed y. Any unauthorised verifier cannot check the validity of this additional signature, as he does not know y. Ohviously, if this countermeasure is used and the functions e, f and l are chosen such that the underlying signature scheme is secure (see [6, 71 for details) then a ( I , n) shared verification signature scheme can also be built using other conventional signature schemes. If such a conventional signature scheme is chosen properly, e.g. 
